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27 Мая 2011
Kyrgyz political scientist describes opposition's. Kyrgyz ombudsman blames security services for abuses
Автор: WikiLeaks
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000288

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DEPT FOR P (WILLIAM BURNS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ POLITICAL SCIENTIST DESCRIBES OPPOSITION'S
PLANS

REF: A. A. BISHKEK 245
¶B. B. BISHKEK 226 AND PREVIOUS
¶C. C. BISHKEK 119

BISHKEK 00000288 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Classified By: Amb. Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with long-time Embassy contact
and political insider Valentin Bogatyrev on March 31 to
discuss the current political situation in the country.
Bogatyrev was convinced that former Presidential
Administration Head Sadyrkulov had been murdered, either
because he presented a political threat to President Bakiyev
or because of his personal conflict with the President's
brother Janysh. He said the opposition had united around a
platform of ousting Bakiyev, and they planned to field
multiple candidates in the July Presidential election, both
to drain support from Bakiyev in the regions and to avoid
making any one candidate the target for government
harassment. Bogatyrev said that the unpopular Bakiyev was
re-orienting Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy toward Russia, while
also moving toward increasing authoritarianism. END SUMMARY

WHO KILLED SADYRKULOV?
----------------------

¶2. (C) Ambassador met March 31 with Valentin Bogatyrev, a
political analyst and long-time Embassy contact. Bogatyrev
had been close to former Presidential Chief of Staff Medet
Sadyrkulov and former director of the Kyrgyz International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Sergei Slepchenko, both of
whom were killed in a suspicious car "accident" March 13 (Ref
B). Bogatyrev had no doubt that Sadyrkulov was murdered, but
was unsure why he was killed. Bogatyrev said that "everyone"
was aware of Sadyrkulov's political project to unite the
opposition around former Vice Prime Minister Elvira Ibraimova
(Ref C); the Bakiyev regime saw this project as a real
political threat and therefore may have wanted to take
Sadrykulov down.

¶3. (C) Bogatyrev said that a second possibility was that
Sadyrkulov's death had been ordered by Janysh Bakiyev,
President Bakiyev's brother and head of the Presidential
Security Service, because of personal rivalries between them.
Bogatyrev conjectured that Janysh may have used a criminal
group from the south of Kyrgyzstan to carry out the act,
using explosive "powder" provided by the security services.
Bogatyrev knew that Ibraimova had been threatened, but did
not believe that she or other opposition leaders were in
immediate physical danger since they do not currently present
a political threat to Bakiyev.

OPPOSITION: GUNNING FOR THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THEY GET GUNNED
DOWN?
-----------

¶4. (C) Bogatyrev claimed to be in regular contact with many
members of the opposition, though he avoided mentioning any
personal role in their activities. Bogatyrev said that
Sadyrkulov, with his network of contacts and tactical
abilities, had been indispensable to cobbling together the
disparate elements of the opposition. Asked if the
opposition could pull together without Sadyrkuklov, Bogatyrev
said that they had essentially united around a platform of
ousting Bakiyev from power. He said the opposition planned
to field multiple candidates for the July Presidential
election, both to drain support from Bakiyev in the regions
and to avoid making any one candidate an exclusive target for
government harassment. Later in the campaign, at the very
least by a second round of the election, they would select
one candidate, likely Ibraimova, but possibly former MP
Bolotbek Sherniyazov, or former Security Council Chair
Miroslav Niyazov.

BISHKEK 00000288 002.2 OF 002

¶5. (C) Bogatyrev argued that Bakiyev is actually very weak
politically right now, with his approval ratings below 10%
and the country facing a difficult financial situation, and
Bakiyev would certainly falsify the July election. Bogatyrev
said that the opposition hopes that exit polls and observers
will limit Bakiyev's ability to cheat, but the opposition is
also preparing to approach election officials at the local
level in advance of the vote and warn them not to cheat.

¶6. (C) According to Bogatyrev, there are two schools of
thought within the opposition on how to go about doing that.
The "light"-oriented opposition would use moral suasion. The
"dark"-oriented opposition is discussing threatening election
officials with "burning down their houses" and "running them
out of their villages" if they participate in cheating. The
"dark" threat would go something like this: "Bakiyev may be
powerful but he is far away in Bishkek. You live in our
village, your house is in our village, your children go to
our bvillage school. We will take vengeance on you if you
cheat and Bakiyev will be too far away to help you."

¶7. (C) Bogatyrev expected the opposition to be successful
in showing their power in the northern regions of Talas,
Naryn, and Issyk Kul, but believed the opposition's ultimate
success would depend on its ability to acquire resources to
fund their efforts. Bogatyrev said that potential wealthy
backers existed, but that they were waiting to see who is
most likely to win power before getting involved.

THE GEOPOLITICAL SHADOWS BEHIND IT ALL
--------------------------------------

¶8. (C) President Bakiyev, according to Bogatyrev, was trying
to re-orient Kyrgyzstan away from a multi-vector foreign
policy and towards Russia, and away from its relatively
liberal past towards authoritarianism. Bakiyev was doing
this, with some success, by appealing to nostalgia for the
Soviet Union. Bogatyrev did not believe that Bakiyev
intended to break his promise to the Russians and let Manas
Air Base remain, but at the same time, Bakiyev wanted to
avoid angering the United States before the July Presidential
election. Therefore, Bogatyrev reasoned, Bakiyev would try
to drag out negotiations over Manas Air Base. Bogatyrev
added that his contacts in Moscow believe that Russia is
having second thoughts about backing the unpopular Bakiyev,
realizing that doing so could endanger its position in
Central Asia. "There are people right now in Moscow dealing
cards with different faces on them," he said. "Each card is
a potential Kyrgyz President and the Russians are trying to
figure out who to back."

COMMENT
-------

¶9. (C) Over the past couple of years, Bogatyrev has been a
reliable reporter of Administration thinking and plans. He
has often been able to accurately presage Bakiyev's actions,
likely due to his connection to Sadyrkulov. He remains well
connected to Kyrgyzstan's political elite, and his
description of the opposition's current election strategy is
generally consistent with what opposition figures have told
us about running multiple candidates. We still doubt,
however, that the opposition will be able to unite behind a
single candidate.
GFOELLER

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000071

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OMBUDSMAN BLAMES SECURITY SERVICES FOR
ABUSES

REF: 09 BISHKEK 1331

BISHKEK 00000071 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kyrgyz Ombudsman for Human Rights
Tursunbek Akun said in a meeting with the Ambassador that he
was very concerned about the deteriorating human rights
situation in Kyrgyzstan. He asserted that the Kyrgyz State
National Security Service (SNB) was responsible for the death
of former Chief of Staff Medet Sadyrkulov, and also for
recent attacks on journalist Gennadiy Pavlyuk, and Manas
Airport President Bakyt Sydykov, among others. In a separate
meeting, former Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov gave a
back-handed compliment to President Bakiyev for keeping the
political opposition in such disorder. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Kyrgyz Ombudsman for Human
Rights Tursunbek Akun on January 25. Akun said that he asked
for the meeting because he values the Embassy's support in
his human rights work. He also said that he was very
concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in
Kyrgyzstan. Akun has served as Ombudsman since March 2008,
and was presumably selected because of his strong
relationship with then Presidential Chief of Staff Medet
Sadyrkulov.

It's All Part of a Chain
------------------------

¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked Akun for his views on the
recent series of assaults on journalists. Akun replied that
they are all links in a chain, going back to the death of
former Presidential Chief of Staff Medet Sadyrkulov in March
¶2009. Echoing the suspicions of most of our interlocutors,
Akun said that Sadyrkulov's death was not an accident -- he
was murdered because of his contacts with the opposition, and
because he had pushed President Bakiyev to cut his family out
of the government. Akun said that SNB Chairman Murat
Sutalinov, and ultimately Janysh Bakiyev, was responsible for
Sadyrkulov's death. Akun said that they had also ordered the
November attack on Manas Airport President Bakyt Sydykov
(who, according to Akun, was XXXXXXXXXXXX injured far more
severely than was publicly acknowledged), the December murder
of journalist Gennadiy Pavlyuk, and several other assaults.
According to Akun, Sutalinov keeps the SNB's hands clean by
using hired thugs from Jalalabad to carry out attacks.

¶4. (C) Akun said that he was well-informed of Sadyrkulov's
activities at the time of his death, because he was one of
Sadyrkulov's three closest friends. Regarding Sadyrkulov's
relationship with Oksana Malevanaya, the current head of the
Presidential Secretariat, Akun said that they had been close,
"if you consider having children together close." However,
Malevanaya and Sadyrkulov had a falling out shortly before
Sadyrkulov resigned as the President's Chief of Staff and
left the government. According to Akun, Sadyrkulov opposed
on principle the idea of setting up a Presidential
Secretariat.

Sadyrkulov's Mistake
--------------------

¶5. (C) Akun said that he maintained good relationships with
the opposition, and for that reason, Bakiyev had asked him to
broker a deal with Ata Meken following the 2007 Parliamentary
elections. Akun said that Ata Meken honestly won 30 seats in
the Parliament, but Sadyrkulov told him to go to Omurbek
Tekebayev, the head of the Ata Meken Party, and offer him 12
seats. Tekebayev refused, and requested 20 seats, but before
Sadyrkulov could respond, Bakiyev intervened, and decided
that Ata Meken should not have any seats in the Parliament.
Akun said that allowing Ata Meken to be shut out of the
Parliament had been one of Sadyrkulov's biggest mistakes.

BISHKEK 00000071 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) Akun said that he would soon send his annual report
on human rights to Parliament, and that it would highlight
the judicial harassment of political opposition members, and
also discuss illegal actions taken by government leaders
during the Presidential campaign and election. When the
Ambassador asked him if the report would include everything
that he had just discussed, he smiled, and said that he is
just a man, and he has to survive to do his job.

He's Bad, but Good
------------------

¶7. (C) At a separate meeting, the Ambassador talked with
former Foreign Minister during the Akayev regime, Askar
Aitmatov, about the current state of the political
opposition. Aitmatov said that the opposition was in
complete disarray, directly blaming President Bakiyev's
efforts to stifle it. In the same breath, Aitmatov
complimented President Bakiyev for being a strong leader and,
curiously, indicated that the political opposition also
viewed him positively because he had so successfully
consolidated political power over the country.

Comment
-------

¶8. (C) Akun has a lengthy history as both a human rights
activist and as a publicity seeker. He claims, with some
truth, that he has been successful as an advocate for victims
of government corruption and persecution. However, according
to sources in the NGO community, Akun is not above selling
his services to families in search of lighter sentences for
their sons or daughters. Akun is more willing to criticize
publicly the government's human rights shortcomings than any
other government official, but he steers well clear of any
criticism of President Bakiyev or his family in public. Akun
sees himself as a bridge between the government and the
democracy and human rights communities.
GFOELLER

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